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Abstract
The 19th and 20th centuries saw a transformation in contraceptive
technologies and their take up. This led to a sexual revolution, which
witnessed a rise in premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births, and a
decline in marriage. The impact of contraception on married and
single life is analyzed here both theoretically and quantitatively. The
analysis is conducted using a model where people search for partners.
Upon …nding one, they can choose between abstinence, a premarital
sexual relationship, and marriage. The model is confronted with some
stylized facts about premarital sex and marriage over the course of
the 20th century. Some economic history is also presented.
Keywords: age of marriage, contraceptive technology, history,
never-married population, number of partners, out-of-wedlock births,
premarital sex, singles.
Comments Welcome: Nezih Guner <nezih.guner cem….es> In preparation for Bisin,
Alberto and Giovanni Federico, Eds. (2020, Expected) Handbook of Historical Economics.
Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam. Dedicated to Stanley L. Engerman, one of the great
economic historians. The authors thank Jordan Herring and Yueyuan Ma for research
assistance. The title refers to John B. Beers’1846 Wife’s Protector contraceptive device.
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Introduction

The forward motion of technology is unrelenting. It’s hard to think of anything else that has a¤ected the economy and society in such a fundamental
way. The Second Industrial Revolution occurred as the clock chimed in the
20th century. It ushered in electricity, the petrochemical industry, and the
internal combustion engine. Its rami…cations were enormous. Electricity and
the internal combustion engine changed the workplace since many manual
tasks could now be mechanized. This combined with fertilizers reduced the
need for farm labor. Along with the automobile it encouraged the rise of
cities and suburbs. Electricity also meant that the home could be mechanized. The mechanization of the home and industry allowed women to enter
the labor force. This provided a catalyst for bestowing women’s rights in the
workplace.1
The Information Age (or the Third Industrial Revolution) is also transforming the economy and society. The ENIAC, the …rst general purpose
computer, was set to work at the University of Pennsylvania in 1945. Machines like this were …rst used in academic and industrial research to perform calculations that were impractical or impossible to do manually. By the
1960s it was apparent that computers could be used to sort, store, process,
and retrieve large volumes of data. Networking and the personal computers
came online in the 1970s and the 1980s. All of this reduced the need for
labor on factory ‡oors, by using numerically controlled machines and ‡exible
manufacturing, and eliminated the need for battalions of clerks, pools of secretaries, scores of purchasing and sales agents, and layers of supervisors and
administrators. The recent rise of arti…cial intelligence is reducing the need
for routine mental labor. The information age has also changed the household. Think about the hours saved from online shopping. Telecommuting
allows parents to stay home with their children. People can now keep in
touch easier with family and friends, so distance matters less. Online dating
has made it easier for singles to …nd mates.2
Seemingly small inventions can also have a huge impact on the economy
and society. Take, for instance, the discovery of penicillin in 1928 by Sir
Alexander Fleming, which was the dawning of the antibiotic era. The lead1

The impact of technology on family life is the subject of the prescient book by Ogburn
and Nimko¤ (1955) and more recently by Greenwood (2018).
2
Billari (2019) reports that in 2017 nearly 40 percent of heterosexual couples met
through online.
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ing causes of death in the United States changed from infectious illnesses
(cholera, diphtheria, pneumonia, smallpox, typhoid fever, plague, syphilis,
tuberculosis, typhus) to noninfectious ones (cardiovascular disease, cancer,
and stroke). At the beginning of the 20th century life expectancy was 47
years compared with 79 years today. Better health and longer lives have
a¤ected educational attainment, labor-force participation, retirement, and
savings. Contraception is another small invention with profound implications.
Technological innovations such as these can be analyzed using quantitative theory. Quantitative-theoretic history aims to develop economic models
of historical issues. The models generally start at the level of pro…t maximization by …rms and/or utility maximization by individuals and then aggregate
up to get a description of the economy as a whole. There are several key ingredients in this approach. First, is posing an interesting historical question.
Second, is providing an historical narrative for the question’s background.
Third, is the development of an economic model to address the question.
Fourth, is analyzing the model to glean intuition about its mechanics and
establish any theoretical propositions. Fifth, is simulating the model to see
if it can deliver a viable explanation of the historical data surrounding the
question of interest. The analysis may end there but often counterfactual
experiments are entertained. Hence, quantitative theory can take data and
ideas from economic history and address them using the tool kit of modern
macroeconomics. The question to be addressed here is: How did technological progress in contraception in‡uence the decline in marriage over the course
of the 20th century? The analysis will follow the above …ve steps.

1.1

Quantitative-Theoretic History: Some Examples

Early examples of using quantitative theory to address historical questions
are the works by Cooley and Ohanian (1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1997), and Ohanian (1997). Cooley and Ohanian (1997) and Ohanian (1997)
study whether it would have been better to …nance World War II by debt
or taxation. Their …nding is that raising taxation in war times, as Keynes
suggested, is a bad idea. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) study three industrial revolutions and …nd that they are characterized by plunging prices
for new technologies, productivity slowdowns, and rising income inequality.
They model these phenomena.
Some more recent examples are Cole and Ohanian (2004), Greenwood,
3

Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Kopecky
(2011), Kopecky and Suen (2010), and Vandenbrouke (2008). Cole and
Ohanian (2004) argue that Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, by strengthening
the power of monopolies and unions, prolonged the Great Depression. This
is in stark contrast with the conventional fawning view of the New Deal. The
secular decline in U.S. fertility from 1800, which was brie‡y interrupted by
the baby boom, is addressed in Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke
(2005). The transition from the preindustrial to the industrial era is modeled by Hansen and Prescott (2002), who emphasize the switch from landintensive to capital-intensive production technologies. Caucutt, Cooley, and
Guner (2013) built on Hansen and Prescott (2002) to study the emergence
of the social security system along this transition. Kopecky (2005) analyzes
the rise in retirement over the course of the 20th century. In 1880 more
than 75 percent of 65-year-old males were still working, compared with only
20 percent in 2000. Kopecky and Suen (2010) develop a model of a city
with two modes of transportation, namely buses and cars, and address the
impact of the automobile on suburbanization between 1910 and 1970. The
expansion of the American West is addressed in Vandenbrouke (2008), using
a model that incorporates endogenous fertility and migration. Last, some
of the literature on marriage discussed in Section 10 also falls within the
category of quantitative-theoretic history; viz., Albanesi and Olivetti (2016),
Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2014), Greenwood and Guner
(2009, 2010), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), Knowles and Vandenbroucke (2019), and Vandenbroucke (2014).

2

The Decline in Marriage
Since the best way to learn about someone else is by being
together, intensive search is more e¤ective when unwed couples
spend considerable time together, perhaps including trial marriages. Yet when contraceptives are crude and unreliable, trial
marriages and other premarital contact greatly raise the risk of
pregnancy. The signi…cant increase during this century in the frequency of trial marriages and other premarital contact has been in
part a rational response to major improvements in contraceptive
techniques, and is not decisive evidence that young people now
value sexual experiences more than they did in the past. Gary S.
4
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Figure 1: Marriage in the United States, 1880 to 2015-18. The …gure plots
the fraction of the female population, ages 18-30, that are never married and
the median age of …rst marriage for women. See the Data Appendix for all
data sources.
Becker (1991, p. 326)
Since World War II there has been a dramatic increase in the fraction of
young women who have never been married and the contemporaneous rise
in the age of …rst marriage. These two trends are shown in Figure 1. (All
data sources are provided in the Data Appendix.) In 1900 only 40 percent of
women in the 18-to-30 age range had never been married. By 2015 this had
jumped to 77 percent. The median age of a …rst marriage rose from 22 to
28. The hypothesis to be entertained here is this: the decline in marriage is
due, at least in part, to technological improvements in contraception. As the
failure rate for contraception fell, the cost of a sexual relationship for a single
woman also declined. This altered the cost/bene…t calculation for marrying
a partner at hand, favoring the option of postponing marriage until a more
suitable partner is found.
Somewhat paradoxically as contraception improved, the number of nonmarital births rose. Over the course of the 20th century non-marital births
rose continuously, as is displayed by the right panel of Figure 2. This occurred
for two reasons: the fraction of never-married women has increased (Figure
1 above) and never-married women are more sexually active today than in
5
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Figure 2: Non-Marital Births in the United States. The right panel shows
non-marital births as a percentage of all births, 1920-2017. The left panel
displays non-marital births by age group per 1,000 women at various times
in the postwar period.
the past (which is discussed below). The left panel shows that non-marital
births have increased throughout the postwar period for every age group of
adult women. Additionally, non-marital births for women in the adult age
groups now exceed those for teenagers.
Never-married women are much more sexually active today than in yesteryear.
The percentage of 20-year-old women experiencing premarital sex rose precipitously over the course of the 20th century. Only 8 percent of women
born around 1900 had premarital sex before age 20, compared with 76 percent born between 1978 and 88–see Figure 3. Furthermore, the circa 1900
cohort of women had around 2.8 sexual partners before marriage, including
their husbands, while the 1959-68 cohort had 7.0 partners.
A marital search model is developed to examine, both theoretically and
quantitatively, the impact on marriage of technological innovation in contraception. The model is set up in Section 4. In particular, each period a single
searches for a partner on a marriage market. If the person is matched, they
can choose either to have a casual relationship with the partner or enter into
marriage. There are two types of casual relationships; viz., sexual and nonsexual ones. A non-marital sexual love a¤air involves the risk of pregnancy,
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Figure 3: Premarital Sex in 20th-Century America. The graph plots the
percentage of women, by various cohorts, who had premarital sex by ages
20 and 30, left axis. It also charts the number of partners these women had
before marriage, right axis.
which depends on the e¤ectiveness of contraception.
When choosing between a casual relationship and marriage a person examines the marriageability of their partner versus the momentary utility from
a non-marital romance and then continuing the search for a more marriageable mate. This choice is presented in Section 5. To keep things simple, the
analysis abstracts from divorce. Likewise, when deciding between either a
premarital abstinent or a sexual relationship the individual weighs o¤ the
extra utility from having sex against the expected cost of an out-of-wedlock
birth. This decision is formalized in Section 6. It is established theoretically
that an improvement in contraceptive technology leads to: a decline in the
rate of marriage (Section 5); an increase in the fraction of the population that
are never-married (Section 7.1); a postponement in the age of marriage (Section 7.1); and a rise in the fraction of singles that are sexually active (Section
7.2). Out-of-wedlock births may rise or fall with an advance in contraceptive
technology (Section 7.4).
The theoretical model is subjected to some quantitative analysis in Section 8. To begin with, a series measuring the failure rate of contraception is
constructed. The odds of a pregnancy for a sexually active women dropped
7

precipitously between 1900 and 2015-18. The analysis focuses on two periods
in U.S. history, 1900 and 2000. The model is calibrated to see if it can match
facts from the U.S. data, such as the waning in the fraction of women who
have ever been married, and the waxing in the fraction of single women who
had premarital sex, out-of-wedlock births, and the number of sexual partners before marriage. The developed framework matches these facts well.
The mapping between data targets and parameter values is unpacked by
computing the Jacobian for the model.
Last, a review of the relevant economics literature on the decline in marriage is presented in Section 10. The discussion now turns to a brief history
of contraception.

3

Contraception in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Birth control advanced along two fronts in the 19th and 20th centuries. First,
knowledge about contraception began to disseminate. Second, there was
improvement in contraceptive technologies. Historically, fertility for married
women was controlled in the United States, albeit very imperfectly, using
primitive contraception. These technologies would have been too risky to
use for unmarried women.
Using a reproductive period of 25 years and an interval between births of
1.5 years, Livi-Bacci (2012) estimates that a reasonable upper bound on the
number of children that a woman can have is 16.7. No society has approached
this theoretical maximal rate of reproduction. The closest examples are the
17th century Québécois and the interwar Canadian Hutterites with total
fertility rates of 11.4 and 9, respectively.3 The total fertility rate for white
women in the United States fell from 7.1 children in 1800 to just 1.9 kids in
2015, as can be seen from the right panel of Figure 4. The …gure also plots the
complementary cumulative distribution functions over births for four cohorts
of married women in the United States before the baby boom–see the left
panel. First, as can be seen, the distribution of births is well within the
biological maximum. Second, the distribution functions are stochastically
decreasing with the year of the cohort. That is, as time progresses a woman
3
Galor and Klemp (2019), in their study of the fecundity of early French Canadian
women, relay that one woman had 22 o¤spring.
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Figure 4: Fertility in the United States. The right panel shows the drop in
the total fertility rate for white women from 1800 to 2015. Complementary
cumulative distribution functions over children ever born for four cohorts of
ever-married women are plotted in the left panel. As such, the vertical axis
presents the percentage of women who had a number of births greater than
or equal to that indicated on the horizontal axis.
was less likely to have a large number of births. For example, the …rst
group of bars shows that 15 percent of women born between 1835 and 1839
had 10 or more births. This had dropped to just 1.7 percent for the 190509 cohort. At the other end of the spectrum, it can be deduced from the
di¤erence in the heights between the …fth and sixth groups of bars that
just 7.7 percent of women in the 1835-39 had no children, while 21 percent
did for those born between 1905 and 1909. The mean number of births
declines with the women’s birth years. The mean of 2.5 for the 1905-09
cohort compares with a total fertility rate of 1.9 in 2015. The 1905-09 cohort
would have been in their …fties by the time the pill was invented. So, the
graph clearly illustrates that somehow family size was limited well before
the advent of modern contraception. Historically, family size was limited
by abortion, abstinence enforced by the prohibition and stigmatization of
premarital sex, crude contraception, child abandonment and infanticide, and
delaying the age of marriage (which was important in light of short lifespans).

9

3.1

Dissemination of Information

In 1823 Francis Place, an English social reformer, circulated a pamphlet in
London titled To the Married of Both Sexes of the Working People. In it he
wrote [Himes (1963, pp. 216-217)]
“What is done by other people is this. A piece of soft sponge is
tied by a bobbin or penny ribbon, and inserted just before the
sexual intercourse takes place, and is withdrawn again as soon as
it has taken place. Many tie a piece of sponge to each end of the
ribbon, and they take care not to use the same sponge again until
it has been washed.”
An early 19th century sponge is shown in the right panel of Figure 5.
In America, Dr. Charles Knowlton (1832) recommended douching in a
pamphlet titled The Fruits of Philosophy (Chapter III on “Promoting and
Checking Conception”), writing
“It consists in syringing the vagina immediately after connection
with a solution of sulphate of zinc, of alum, pearl-ash, or any salt
that acts chemically on the semen, and at the same time produces
no unfavorable e¤ect on the female.”
The …rst edition was published anonymously, given the puritanical beliefs
of the time. For trying to distribute his book, Knowlton was imprisoned
for three months. Figure 5, left panel, shows an early vaginal syringe used
for douching. Last in Moral Physiology; or, A Brief and Plain Treatise on
the Population Question (Chapter VI) Robert Dale Owen (1842) advocated
withdrawal, stating
“Among the modes of preventing conception which may have prevailed in various countries, that which has been adopted, and is
now practised by the cultivated classes on the continent of Europe, by the French, the Italians, and, I believe, by the Germans
and Spaniards, consists of complete withdrawal, on the part of
the man, immediately previous to emission. This is, in all cases,
e¤ectual.”
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Figure 5: A 19th century pewter vaginal syringe with its case is displayed
in the left panel. The right panel shows a rubber sponge, in its original box
(circa 1901-1930). Sponges were widely used as contraception in the early
1900s. Sponges were often soaked in spermicidal agents, of varying e¤ectiveness. In a 1914 pamphlet Family Limitation, Margaret Sanger relayed that
absorbing boric acid into the sponge yielded “satisfactory results.” Sources:
wellcomecollection.org and Science Museum, London.
The dissemination of knowledge about birth control picked up dramatically at the start of the 20th century. In 1916 Margaret Sanger opened the
…rst birth control clinic in America. Some 400 women received instruction
about contraception before the clinic was closed by the police nine days later.
Sanger served a thirty day jail sentence in 1917 for opening the clinic. Following a 1918 ruling by the New York State Court of Appeals in The People
of the State of New York v. Margaret H. Sanger, which allowed contraception
to be distributed by physicians, she opened the …rst continuously operational
birth control clinic in 1923. The clinic was sta¤ed by female physicians and
counselors. In London, England, Mary Stopes did much the same thing,
opening in 1921 the …rst birth control clinic in the British Empire. The …rst
medical book in America aimed at providing physicians with up-to-date scienti…c information about contraception was the Technique of Contraception:
The Principle and Practice of Anti-Conceptional Methods, written by Dr.
James F. Cooper in 1928. A table in the book (p. 221) gave failures rates for
condoms, douching, cervical stems, spermicides, withdrawal, etc. The book
was dedicated to Margaret Sanger.

11

3.2

Technological Advance

There also was considerable technological advance in contraception over this
period. Start with the condom. In 1844 The United States Practical Receipt
Book (p. 87) provided instructions on how to make a condom:
“Take the caecum of the sheep; soak it …rst in water, turn it on
both sides, then repeat the operation in a weak ley of soda, which
must be changed every four or …ve hours for …ve or six successive
times; then remove the mucus membrane with the nail; sulphur,
wash in clean water, and then in soap and water; rinse, in‡ate,
and dry. Next cut it to the required length and attach a piece of
ribbon to the open end. Used to prevent infection or pregnancy.
The di¤erent qualities consist of extra pains being taken in the
above process, and in polishing, scenting, &c.”
Packages of a dozen rubber condoms were selling in 1890 for 50 cents. At
the time a tradesman would have earned an hourly wage of 20 cents, so this
translates into a time price of 2.5 hours of work. Quality control was an
issue; however, giving condoms a bad name. According to Tietze (1963), a
study conducted in 1934-1935 found the following distribution over defects:
burst, 29.4 percent; holes, 15.2 percent; ‡aws, 14.5 percent; total, 59.1 percent. This led to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration controlling quality
standards. Also, Dr. Cooper in his 1928 medical book noted another disadvantage: “Blunting of sensation. Frequent refusal by male.” The quality of
condoms had increased dramatically by the 1960s, making them one of the
most e¤ective forms of contraception.

In 1846 the United States Patent O¢ ce granted patent number 4,729.
The introduction to the patent speci…cation read:
“Be it known that I, John B. Beers, of the city of Rochester, in
the county of Monroe and State of New York, have invented a
new Instrument called the ‘wife’s protector,’the design of which
is to Prevent conception.”

12

Figure 6: The left panel shows a European condom, made from animal gut,
in a waxed paper envelope (circa 1801-1850). The right panel pictures a reusable English rubber condom in its original box, complete with instructions
(circa 1948). Source: Science Museum, London.
The drawing that was submitted with his patent application is shown in
Figure 7. The speci…cation of Beers’letters patent is provided in Appendix
11. His Wife’s Protector instrument inserted a hoop covered by a oil-silk
membrane that prevented semen from entering the uterus. An interesting
feature of the patent speci…cation is that it explicitly stated that it was
intended to prevent pregnancy, a risky venture at the time. Cervical caps
and diaphragms also were introduced in the 1800s. The left panel of Figure 8
shows a late 19th century German pessary. The pessary was an intracervical
device (IUC). It worked after conception by provoking a foreign in‡ammatory
reaction that stops a newly fertilized embryo from implanting and growing
in the lining of the uterus.
There was also technological improvement in spermicides, used with or
without other contraceptives such as condoms, diaphragms, sponges, etc.
An English pharmacist introduced in 1885 a suppository made out of cocoa
butter and quinine sulfate. Others at the time combined cocoa butter, which
melted at a low temperature, with boric acid, tannic acid, or bichloride of
mercury. In 1937 phenylmercuric acetate was introduced in a product called
Volper. This was a highly e¤ective spermicide, but was subsequently banned
in the United States because of concerns about mercury. In the 1950s surface
active agents (surfactants) were introduced. These are non-irritating. On
this, in the past many products were used as spermicides. For example,

13

Figure 7: The drawing that was submitted with John B. Beers’1846 patent
application for his Wife’s Protector contraceptive device.
Sanger (1914) mentions Lysol in Family Limitation and Belsky (1975) relays
that Coca-Cola was used in India.
In the 1920s German gynecologist Ernst Grafenberg developed the intrauterine device (IUD), displayed in the right panel of Figure 8. Both the
pessary and this early IUD were infection prone. And it should be noted that
pelvic infections could only be dealt with easily after the introduction of antibiotics in the 1940s. Fast forwarding to 1967, Howard Tatum and Jamie
Zipper developed the …rst copper-bearing IUD. It was T shaped and made of
inert plastics, which made it …t better and less vulnerable to infection. Zipper
had shown that copper reduced the risk of pregnancy in rabbits. Interestingly, Grafenberg’s IUD also contained copper, but its e¤ect on preventing
pregnancy went unnoticed.
Also in the 1920s and 1930s two gynecologists, Kyusaku Ogino and Hermann Knaus, provided an accurate tracking of the ovulation cycle. This
provide a scienti…c basis for the rhythm method. As a result inexpensive
devices were marketed, such as the Rythmeter, which calculated the time
of ovulation and the periods of fertility and infertility. The rhythm method
evolved into more modern ones, such as Sympto-Thermal Method of the late
1970s, which combines the rhythm calendar with changes in body temperature and cervical mucus.
14

Figure 8: A gold wishbone stem pessary is pictured in the left panel. It was
developed around 1880 in Germany. The right side panel shows a Grafenberg
IUD, circa 1920s. Source: Science Museum, London.

The pill symbolizes technological improvement in contraception. It synthesizes two hormones, estrogen and progestin, in order to prevent ovulation.
Scientists discovered and isolated hormones in the 1930s. Manufacturing
them was expensive and slow, though. Russell Marker developed an e¢ cient
method for doing so in the 1950s. Around that time Carl Djerassi synthesized
a progestin that could be taken orally. Capitalizing on these earlier breakthroughs, biologists Min Chueh Chang and Gregory Pincus teamed together
with obstetrician John Rock to develop the pill, which was approved by the
FDA in 1960. Today transdermal patches, implants, and injections can be
used to deliver estrogen and progestin.

4

Setup

Each period a new cohort of adult singles enters the economy. The initial
size of a cohort is one, with a per-period survival rate for a person of . The
analysis focuses on steady states. Given this, the time-invariant size of the
population is 1=(1
).
Imagine the problem facing a single. This single will meet a partner in the
current period with probability . If a meeting occurs, the person can decide
to have either a marital or non-marital relationship with their partner. There
15

Figure 9: Timing of Events. The diagram shows the timing of events within
a period. The circles denote nodes when an individual is single, whereas
the diamonds represent nodes when they are married. A single matches
with probability . If matched, they remain single with probability W (w ),
have sex with odds 1 L(l ), and have an out-of-wedlock birth (owb) with
probability, 1
. The determination of w and l is discussed in the next
two sections.
are two types of non-marital love a¤airs: sexual and nonsexual ones. An
abstinent romantic entanglement yields a momentary utility level of a 0.
A sexual liaison results in a current utility level of l > a. Libido, l, for the
current love a¤air is drawn from the cumulative distribution function L(l),
with associated density function L1 (l). The value of l is known at the time of
deciding between either an abstinent or sexual relationship. A non-marital
sexual relationship may result in an out-of-wedlock birth. With probability
the person avoids a pregnancy, while with probability 1
they do not.
Let an out-of-wedlock birth have a utility cost of O. Finally, if the person
marries, then they get the random lifetime utility w. The value of being
wed, w 0, is drawn from the cumulative distribution function W (w), with
associated density function W1 (w). The value of w is known at the time of
the marriage decision, but the level of joy, l, from a casual sexual endeavour
is not. Marriage is an absorbing state. People discount the future at rate ,
which incorporates the survival rate of . Figure 9 illustrates the timing of
events in the model.
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5

Married or Single Life?

The key step in the analysis is formulating the recursion that de…nes the
expected lifetime utility of being single in the current period, S. Suppose
that the person is single in the current period. With probability 1
the
person remains unmatched. In this case, they realize no current utility. Since
they enter next period as unmarried, the discounted expected utility for an
unmatched single is S. With probability
they meet someone. If so,
the single can choose either to marry or remain single. On the one hand,
married life yields the lifetime utility w. On the other hand, let the expected
momentary utility for a matched single be N ( ), which is increasing in the
odds of safe sex . The function N ( ) is unpacked in the next section. The
matched single will enter next period still single, which has the discounted
continuation value of S. Hence, the expected lifetime utility for a matched
single is N ( ) + S. Clearly, a matched single will choose the option that
yields the highest level of expected lifetime utility. The decision to marry in
the current period can be cast as
Marry,
if w N ( ) + S;
Remain Single, if w < N ( ) + S;
where recall that the marriage decision is made after the value for w is realized. There will exist a threshold rule for w, denoted by w , such that
Marry,
if w w ;
Remain Single, if w < w ;
where w is given by
(1)

w = N ( ) + S:
It is now easy to see that S satis…es the recursion
S = (1
) S + E[maxfN ( ) + S; wg]:
{z
}
| {z } |
unmatched

matched

The above recursion can be rewritten as
S = (1

) S + fW (w )[N ( ) + S] +
|
{z
}
w
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Z

w

wdW (w)g;

which implies

R
W (w )w + w wdW (w)
:
S=
1 (1
)
Therefore, by substituting (2) into (1), it follows that at the threshold
R
W (w )w + w wdW (w)
w = N( ) + [
]:
1 (1
)

(2)

So how does contraception a¤ect marriage? To see this, totally di¤erentiate the above equation with respect to and w to get
dw
=
d
1

N1 ( )
W (w )=[1 (1

) ]

> 0:

In obtaining and signing this expression three facts are worth noting. First,
the expected momentary utility for a matched single is increasing in the odds
of safe sex, , implying N1 ( ) > 0–Proposition 3 in theR next section establishes this. Second, at the threshold d [ W (w )w + w wdW (w)]=dw =
W (w ). Third,
1

W (w )=[1

(1

) ]= 1

f1

[1

W (w )]g =[1

(1

) ] > 0:

Intuitively speaking, when contraception becomes more e¤ective there is
a hike in the expected momentary utility for a matched single, N ( ). As a
result, matched singles become choosier about who they will marry and the
threshold value of love that has to be met for a marriage, w , moves up. The
situation is portrayed in Figure 10. For a matched individual the value of
marriage is just w. This is shown by the 450 degree line marked w. The
expected lifetime value of life for a person who is currently single is shown
by the line labelled N ( ) + S. This line is not a function of the realized
value for w, as can be seen by inspecting equation (2). The threshold value
for w, or w , at which the individual is indi¤erent between marriage and
single life occurs where the w and N ( ) + S lines intersect. Suppose that
contraception improves; in other words, let rise. The expected value of
single life moves up, as shown by the shift in the curve from N ( ) + S to
N ( 0 ) + S 0 . The fact that S 0 > S is shown below. The w curve does not
shift, since the random draw for married life is not a function of . As a
result, the threshold value for marriage, w , increases from w to w 0 . This
causes the fraction of matched singles who choose not to marry to rise from
W (w ) to W (w 0 ). The above analysis is summarized by the proposition
below.
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Figure 10: The determination of w and W (w ). The threshold for marriage,
w , is determined where the N ( ) + S and w lines intersect. To the left of
w a person will choose single life, because the N ( )+ S curve lies above the
w one. To the right the opposite happens. An increase in the e¤ectiveness of
contraception, , results in the N ( ) + S curve shifting up to N ( 0 ) + S 0 .
As a consequence the threshold for marriage moves higher or rightward from
w to w 0 . The fraction of matched singles choosing not to marry then rises
from W (w ) to W (w 0 ).
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Proposition 1 (Marriage Rate) An improvement in contraception, or an
increase in , leads to a decline in the marriage rate, 1 W (w ), propelled
by an increase in w .
Interestingly, the expected
lifetime utilities for both married and single
R
lives, f1=[1 W (w )]g w wdW (w) and S, increase. For married life, it is
straightforward to calculate that
R
d f1=[1 W (w )]g w wdW (w)
d
Z
1
1
dw
[
wdW (w) w ]W1 (w )
=
> 0;
1 W (w ) 1 W (w ) w
d

where the term in brackets on the righthand side is greater than 0. The
expected lifetime value of married life rises because the expected value of
single life has improved. This allows singles to be pickier about their marriage
partner. For single life, it follows from equation (2) that
dS
=
d
1

W (w ) dw
> 0:
(1
) d

This justi…es the upward shift of the N ( ) + S curve, following an increase in
, that is shown in Figure 10–by assumption N ( ) is increasing in . Single
life improves because there is a boost in the expected momentary utility for
a matched single, N ( ), due to the fact that premarital sex is now safer.

6

An Abstinent or Sexual NonMarital Relationship?

Consider the decision facing a matched single who has decided not to marry.
An abstinent relationship yields a momentary utility value of a, while for a
sexual one it depends on libido, l. At the time of making this decision the
person knows the value of l. On the one hand, a sexual endeavour leads
to the thrill l. On the other hand, the person may become pregnant with
probability 1
and su¤er the cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, O. Therefore,
the expected momentary utility from a sexual relationship is l (1
)O.
The momentary utility for a matched single who has decided not to marry
and subsequently drawn a value for l is given by
maxfa; l

(1
20

)Og:

Hence, the decision to have a non-marital sexual relationship is described by
Abstinent,
l a + (1
Sexual Relationship, l > a + (1

)O;
)O:

There will exist a threshold rule for l, denoted by l , such that
Abstinent,
if l l ;
Sexual Relationship, if l > l ;
where l is given by
l = a + (1

)O:

(3)

Therefore, the odds of abstinent and sexual relationships, contingent on
being matched, are L(l ) and 1 L(l ). The fraction of singles having premarital sex is then [1 L(l )]. As the e¢ cacy of contraception, , improves,
the probability of an out-of-wedlock birth for a sexually active single drops.
So, the expected cost, (1
)O, of being sexually active declines. As a result,
there will be more sexually active singles. Figure 11 illustrates the situation.
The 450 line marked l in the upper panel is the bene…t from premarital sex.
The horizontal line labeled a + (1
)O represents its cost. This has two
components; namely, the forgone value of abstinence, a, and the expected
cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, (1
)O. The threshold level of libido, l , is
determined in the upper panel where the l and a + (1
)O lines intersect or
where the cost and bene…t of premarital sex are equalized. The lower panel
plots the cumulative distribution function L(l). As such, it gives the odds
of abstinence, L(l ), conditional on a match. When contraception improves,
the cost of premarital sex falls so that the a + (1
)O line moves down to
0
0
a + (1
)O, which results in l dropping to l . The fraction of matched
singles that pick abstinence declines from L(l ) to L(l 0 ).
Proposition 2 (Sexually Active Singles) The fraction of singles in a sexual
relationship, [1 L(l )], is increasing in the odds of safe sex, .
Proof. It’s easy to see that
1

dL(l )
= L1 (l )O > 0 [using (3)]:
d
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Figure 11: The determination of l and L(l ). The threshold level of libido,
l , occurs where the l and a + (1
)O lines in the upper panel intersect.
An increase in lowers the cost of premarital sex, so that a + (1
)O shifts
0
0
down to a + (1
)O. As a result, l drops to l . The odds of abstinence
for a matched single fall, consequently, from L(l ) to L(l 0 ), as shown by the
lower panel.
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The expected momentary utility of not marrying for a matched single is
Z
ldL(l) [1 L(l )](1
)O:
(4)
N ( ) = L(l )a +
l

The level of expected utility for a matched single improves with technological
progress in contraception for two reasons. First, for a sexually active single
the odds of an out-of-wedlock birth have declined. Second, a single is more
likely to be sexually active, since 1 L(l ) rises, and
R having sex yields a higher
level of expected utility than abstinence because l ldL(l) (1
)O > a.
Proposition 3 (Current Utility for a Matched Single) The level of current
expected utility for a matched single, N ( ), is increasing in the odds of safe
sex, ; i.e., N1 ( ) > 0.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to
N1 ( ) = L1 (l )O[ a + l

(1

)O] + [1

yields
L(l )]O
= [1

L(l )]O > 0;

where use is made of the facts that dL(l )=d = L1 (l )O and l = a + (1
)O. Therefore, the momentary expected utility value for a matched single
rises with the odds of safe sex, .

7

Statistical Mechanics

7.1

Marriage by Age

How many people will be married by a given age in the population? Recall
that each period a cohort of new adult singles enters the economy. This
cohort initially has unit mass but its size atrophies over time according to
the survival rate . Follow this cohort as it ages period by period. Suppose
that at the end of period j 1 there are sj 1 singles around from the cohort.
Then, there will be sj 1 singles around at the beginning of period j. Out
of this,
sj 1 people match implying that the number of new marriages is
nj

W (w )] sj 1 ; where s0

[1

1= :

The number of singles in the cohort then evolves according to
sj = sj

1

nj = [1
23

+ W (w )]j

j 1

:

Marriage Statistics for a Cohort
Age Newly Married, n
Remaining Single, s
1
n1 = [1 W (w )]
s1 = 1
+ W (w )
2
n2 = [1 W (w )] s1
s2 = [1
+ W (w )]2
..
..
..
.
.
.
j
nj = [1 W (w )] sj 1 sj = [1
+ W (w )]j j 1

by Age
Total Married, m
m1 = n1
m2 = m1 + n2
..
.
mj = mj

1

Table 1: The evolution of a cohort by age. Each period a new cohort of unit
mass enters the economy. The table gives the fractions by age of the original
cohort that are newly married, single, married, and surviving. In a steady
state the total size of the population is 1=(1
). An entry in a cell also
represents number of people in the population in the designated situation.
To get the fraction of the population in this case just divide by 1=(1
).
The term on the right is easy to explain. If a person enters a period single,
then the odds of them exiting the period single are given by 1
+ W (w ).
On this, the probability of not matching is 1
, while the probability of
matching and not marrying is W (w ). So, the odds of not marrying at the
end of j periods are [1
+ W (w )]j while the chance of surviving this
long is j 1 . To summarize, the cohort evolves in the manner displayed in
Table 1.

The impact of contraception on the married and never-married populations can now be analyzed. The fraction of the age-j population that is never
married is
sj
;
j 1
while the portion of the population up to and including age j that is never
married is
Pj
si
(5)
Pj i=1 i 1 :
i=1

Now suppose that the odds of safe sex, , improve due to technological
progress in contraception. From Proposition 3 single life becomes more enjoyable. Therefore, a matched single will become pickier about who they
marry; that is, w rises from Proposition 1. The fraction of never-married
individuals in the population at large moves up, as a consequence.
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+ nj

Surviving
1
..
.
j 1

Proposition 4 (Never-Married Population) The fraction of the population
that is never married, as de…ned by (5), is increasing in the e¢ cacy of contraception, .
+ W (w )]j

Proof. Using the fact that sj = [1
dsj
= j[1
d

+ W (w )]j

1 j 1

j 1

W1 (w )

, it is immediate that

dw
> 0;
d

where the sign follows from Proposition 1.
The average age of marriage for the age-j population is
Pj
ini
.
Pi=1
j
i=1 ni

(6)

One may conjecture that an increase in the e¢ cacy of contraception will
postpone the mean age of marriage because the rate of marriage at any age
drops by Proposition 1. This is true, but the reasoning is not straightforward because the number of the age-i newly married in the population, ni ,
decreases in both the numerator and denominator of (6).
Proposition 5 (Mean and Median Ages of Marriage) The mean and median
ages of marriage are increasing in the e¢ cacy of contraception, .
Proof. See the Theory Appendix.

7.2

Premarital Sex

Let vj 1 represent the size of the age-(j 1) population that has never had
sex. The size of the age-j populace that hasn’t had sex is given by vj = [1
+ W (w )L(l )] vj 1 , where v0 1= . To understand this expression, …rst
note that only vj 1 of the original age-(j 1) virgin population will survive
until age j. Second, out of this the fraction 1
will remain unmatched. The
proportion will match, but from this segment the fraction W (w )L(l ) will
choose both not to marry and not to have sex with their partner. Therefore,
the fraction of the age-j population that has never had sex is
vj
j 1

= [1

+ W (w )L(l )]j :
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Now,
d(vj =
d

j 1

)

= j[1

+ W (w )L(l )]j

1

fW1 (w )L(l )

dw
dl
+ W (w )L1 (l )
g R 0:
d
d
|{z}
|{z}
+

This expression is ambiguous because while safer sex leads to a decrease in
the number of age-j singles who are abstinent, via a drop in the threshold
level of libido, l , it also increases the pool of age-j singles, through a rise in
the threshold value for marriage, w .
Additionally, there are age-j marrieds who didn’t have premarital sex. For
example, at age j there will be [1 W (w )] vj 1 individuals who marry
but didn’t have premarital sex. So, the fraction of the age-j population that
didn’t have premarital sex is
P
vj + [1 W (w )] ji=1 j+1 i vi 1
:
j 1
The fraction of the age-j single population that has never had sex is
[1
+ W (w )L(l )]j
vj
=
sj
[1
+ W (w )]j j

j 1
1

=[

1

+ W (w )L(l ) j
]:
1
+ W (w )

Proposition 6 (Premarital Sex) The fraction of the age-j single population,
1 vj =sj , that has had premarital sex is increasing in the odds of safe sex,
.
Proof. The proposition holds because
1
+ W (w )L(l ) j 1
d(vj =sj )
= j[
]
d
1
+ W (w )
[1
+ W (w )]W (w )L1 (l )dl =d
(1
)W1 (w )[1
2
[1
+ W (w )]
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L(l )]dw =d

< 0:

Statistics on the Number of Singles with i Sexual Partners by Age j

A ge 1
A ge 2
.
.
.
A ge j

0
p0
+ W (w )L(l )
1 = 1
0
p0
2 = p1 [1
+ W (w )L(l )]
.
.
.
0
0
pj = pj 1 [1
+ W (w )L(l )]

Sexual P artners
1
2
p1
=
W
(w
)[1
L(l
)]
p2
1
1 = 0
p1
L(l )]p0
p2
W (w )[1
L(l )]p1
2 = f W (w )[1
1
2 =
1
+[(1
) + W (w )L(l )]p1
1g
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
0
2
pj = f W (w )[1
L(l )]pj 1
pj = f W (w )[1
L(l )]p1
j 1
+[(1
) + W (w )L(l )]p1
g
+[(1
)
+
W
(w
)L(l
)]p2
j 1
j 1g

Table 2: The distribution over the number of premarital sexual partners that
singles have at each age.

7.3

Number of Sexual Partners

A variable of interest is the average number of premarital sexual partners
that an age-j person has. Let pij be the number of singles that have had i
sexual partners by age j. First, given the model’s timing structure, pij = 0 for
i > j. Second, for an age-j single to have 0 sexual partners they must have
had 0 sexual partners at age-(j 1), survive into period j with chance , and
then either remain unmatched with probability 1
or match with odds
, decide not to marry with likelihood W (w ), and not to have premarital
sex with chance L(l ). Therefore, p0j = p0j 1 [1
+ W (w )L(l )], with
0
p0 1= . Likewise, for an age-j single to have j sexual partners they must
have had j 1 sexual partners at age-(j 1) which happens with probability
pjj 11 , survive with chance , then match and remain single in period j with
odds W (w ), and …nally decide to have sex with probability 1 L(l ). This
implies pjj = W (w )[1 L(l )]pjj 11 .
Finally, there are exactly three ways for an age-j single to have i sexual
partners, where i < j. First, they could have had i 1 partners at age
j 1, survive, match and remain single, and then have decided to have
sex. There will be
W (w )[1 L(l )]pji 11 people in this category. Second,
they could have had i sexual partners in period j 1, survive, but not
match. There will be (1
)pij 1 such singles. Third, they could have had
i sexual partners in period j 1, survive, match, remain single, and decide
not to have sex. The number of singles here is
W (w )L(l )pij 1 . Hence,
pij = f W (w )[1 L(l )]pij 11 + [(1
) + W (w )L(l )]pij 1 g.

The number of sexual partners that a person has before marriage can
be computed using the statistics in Table 2. Let qji be the number of age-j
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j
j

p1 = 0
j
p2 = 0

j
pj

=

[1

.
.
.
W (w )
j

1

L(l )]pj 1

married people that have had i partners before marriage. First, to have had
j 1 partners by age j you must have had j 1 partners while single up to
age j 1, survived to age j, and then gotten married. So, the number of age-j
married people who have had j 1 partners is qjj 1 = [1 W (w )]pjj 11 .
Second,
qji =

[1

W (w )]pij

1

+

2

W (w )]pij

[1

2

+

+

j i

[1

W (w )]pii ;

for 0 < i j 1. On this, note that the earliest you can have i partners is at
age i. At age i there will be pii such singles. Out of this group, [1 W (w )]pii
will marry at age i + 1 and then survive to period j with probability j i 1 .
Likewise, pih singles of age h, for i h j 1, will have had i partners at
age h, then gotten married at age h + 1 with probability [1 W (w )], and
subsequently survived to age j with probability j h 1 .
Last, for an age-j married person to have 0 sexual partners they must
have survived until age j and gotten married without having premarital sex.
They could marry at any age up to and including j. Thus, to summarize
qji

= [1

W (w )]

j 1
X

j h i
ph ;

for 0

i

j

1.

(7)

h=i

Empirically, it may be desirable to include the person that you marry as a
partner.
Now, the average number of sexual partners that an age-j married person
has is
j
j
X
X
iqji
iqji
i=0
j

X

=

qji

i=0

mj

;

(8)

i=0

where mj is the total number of people who are married at age j as de…ned
in Table 1. A reasonable conjecture might be that the average number of
premarital partners that an age-j married person has is increasing in the
e¢ cacy of contraception, . While this can’t be established theoretically
speaking, it still can be true quantitatively.
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7.4

Out-of-Wedlock Births

The fraction of matched singles that have an out-of-wedlock birth, o, is given
by o = (1
)[1 L(l )]. This can rise or fall with , depending on whether
do
=
d

|

[1

L(l )]
{z
}

improved contraception

+

(1
|

)

1

dL(l )
{z d
}

R 0:

increase in sexual activity

This is an elasticity question that can be rephrased as
(1
) 1
do
R 0 as
d
[1 L(l )]

dL(l )
R 1:
d

The shape of the distribution function L(l) will determine whether out-ofwedlock births for matched singles rise or fall with the odds of safe sex, .
For the population at large, equation (5) gives the fraction who have not
married by age j. Out of this group, the portion will be matched in the
current period. The fraction 1 W (w ) will marry, while the slice W (w )
won’t. Therefore the fraction of the nonmarried population that will be
matched and remain single is given by W (w )=f1
[1 W (w )]g. Out of
this, the cut 1 L(l ) will be sexually active. Consequently, given the failure
rate, 1
, the fraction of the population up to and including age j that has
an out-of-wedlock birth in the current period is
Pj
si
W (w )
(9)
(1
)[1 L(l )]
Pj i=1 i 1 :
1
[1 W (w )] i=1
Clearly, this can rise or fall with , because, as was just shown, (1
L(l )] can rise or fall in .

8
8.1

)[1

Calibration
The Procedure

The quantitative analysis focuses on two periods, namely 1900 and 2000. A
steady state for the model is computed for each of these periods. The model
period is taken to be four months (or a tertile). Functional forms for the
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distribution functions governing libido, l, and marriageability, w, need to be
chosen. Let libido be governed by a Weibull distribution. Speci…cally,
L(l) = 1

exp[ (l= ) ], for ; > 0,

where and are the scale and shape parameters, respectively. Assume that
marriageability has an exponential distribution. In particular,
W (w) = 1

exp[ (w= )], for

> 0.

Here is the mean of the marriageability distribution.
Two criteria are used for selecting parameter values. First, the values
for some parameters can be assigned from a priori information. Second, the
remaining parameter values are chosen so that the model matches, as well as
possible, a set of data targets. Start with the parameters chosen on the basis
of a priori information. Denote the discount factor, sans the survival rate, by
. Given this, = . The discount factor, , is given the standard value of
0:961=3 . People are assumed to have a life span relevant for marriage decisions
of 30 years. The four month survival rate, , is set at 0:99241=3 for 1900 and
0:99971=3 for 2001.4 The failure rates for contraception are taken directly
from the data, as discussed below. Last, the mean for the marriageability
distribution, or , is just a normalization. On this, suppose that a solution
to the model has been found for some value of . The same solution obtains
for
, for > 1, if a; O;and are also multiplied by . What matters for
an individual’s choices are the relative values of abstinence, premarital sex,
and marriage. So, set = 1:0.
The values for the rest of the parameters are selected to hit a set of
stylized facts. Let Dj represent the j-th data target. Likewise, Pj ( ) is
the model’s prediction for the j-th target, as a function of the parameters,
(a; ; O; ; ), to be selected. These parameter are picked to minimize the
relative predictions error of the model. Therefore, solves the minimization
problem
18
X
Dj Pj ( ) 2
min
!j [
];
(10)
Dj
j=1

where ! j is the weight placed on target j. The set of targeted stylized facts
is (where ! j = 1 unless indicated otherwise):
4

These are in line with the numbers for 20- to 45–year-old women reported in the
CDC’s National Vital Statistics Reports.
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Parameter Values
Parameter
Value, 1900
Set using ex ante information
J
90
3
0:961=3
0:99241=3
(1 0:72)1=3
1.0
Set via calibration routine
0.085
22.723
a
0.027
O
0.1806
0.3359

Value, 2000

Description

90
3
0:961=3
0:99971=3
(1 0:18)1=3
1.0

# of periods
periodicity, months
discount factor
survival rate
Pr(safe sex)
exponential, mean–w

0.085
22.723
0.027
0.1806
0.3359

Weibull, scale–l
Weibull, shape–l
abstinence
out-of-wedlock birth
matching rate

Table 3: Parameter Values. The parameters set on the basis of ex ante
information are discussed in the text. The remaining parameters are selected
in line with the minimization routine (10).
1. The median age of marriage in 1900 and 2000.
2. The fraction of women by age group who had ever been married in 1900
and 2000. Each of the three age groups for a year has a weight of 1=3.
3. The fraction of women by age group who had premarital sex in 1900
and 2004. Again, each of the three age groups for a year is weighted
by 1=3.
4. The number of out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 unmarried women in
1920 and 1998.
5. The number of partners (including future husband) before marriage in
1900 and 2000.
The parameters values that result from the calibration procedure are listed
in Table 3. All parameters values are kept constant across the two steady
states, except for the failure rate of contraception, which is discussed now.
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8.2

The Failure Rate for Contraception, 1900 to 20152018

An important ingredient for the quantitative analysis is the failure rate for
contraception. Figure 12 shows the dramatic decline in the failure rate for
contraception starting in 1900 and moving forward to 2015-18. The failure
rate gives the odds of a woman becoming pregnant if she has sex at the
normal frequency for a period of one year. For each year the series harnesses
the frequency distribution over the contraceptive practices used by women.
This will depend on both the contraception technologies that are available
at the time and their di¤usion among sexually active women. The latter
hinges upon the dissemination of information about, and the dispensation
of, contraception. It also takes into account that some women won’t use
any method, including just withdrawal. Then, to compute the overall failure
rate, the failure rate for each contraception is averaged across the di¤erent
practices using the observed frequency distribution for usage. As can be seen,
engaging in premarital sex in 1900 would have been very risky given the 72
percent odds of pregnancy. By 2015-18, the odds had dropped to 18 percent.
Further detail on the construction of the failure rates is provided in the Data
Appendix.

8.3

Findings

The upshot of the calibration procedure is presented in Table 4. First, between 1900 and 2000 the median age of marriage in the United States rose
from 21.9 to 25.1 years. The model does a good job replicating this fact,
with the median age of marriage moving up from 21.15 to 25.44 years. In the
United States there was a big drop between 1900 and 2000 in the percentage
of 15- to 24-year-old women that were ever married; an 11 percentage point
drop from 29.62 to 18.17 percent. The model also displays an 11 percentage
point drop, but too many women are married in this age group for both
periods. Additionally, in the model for the year 2000 too few women have
been married in the 25-to-34 and 35-to-44 age groups.
Second, single women became much more sexually active between 1900
and 2000. In the U.S. data for 1900, only 8 percent of women had experienced
premarital sex by age 20, 14 percent by age 25, and still only 26 percent by
age 30. The model mimics this low level of sexual activity well, with the
corresponding numbers being 12, 18, and 21 percent. It over predicts the
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Figure 12: The annual failure rate for contraception, 1900 to 2015-18. The
failure rate series is predicated upon the e¤ectiveness of contraceptive technologies available at each point in time as well as the usage distribution by
women.
rise in premarital sexual activity. In the 2000 data 76 percent of women had
engaged in premarital sex by age 20, a rise of 68 percentage points, while
in the model 94 percent did, which represents an increase of 82 percentage
points.
Third, over the period in question out-of-wedlock births in the United
States shot up from 8.7 per 1,000 single women to 44.3. There is also a large
increase in the model from 3.4 to 33.6. This represents an increase in the
data of 35.6 pregnancies per 1,000 single women and an increase of 30.2 for
the model. Additionally, single women now have sex with more partners than
in the past. In 1900 a woman had on average 2.8 partners before marriage,
including her future husband. The corresponding …gure in the model is 1.2,
when the future husband is also counted. This rose to 7.0 partners in the 2000
data and to 8.2 for the model. Overall, the model does a good job explaining
the targeted set of facts. The relationship between parameter values and
data targets is inspected by computing the Jacobian for the model. At the
calibrated equilibrium, the parameter values a¤ect premarital sex in 1900
more than in 2000. This makes sense because almost nobody had premarital
sex in 1900 while most 20 year olds have experienced it today. Likewise, the
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Data Targets
Description
Marriage
Median Age
Ever Married, %
Age 15-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Premarital Sex, %
By Age 20
By Age 25
By Age 30
O.w.b.’s per 1,000 Singles
Partners before Marriage

1900
2000
U.S. Data Model U.S. Data Model
21.9

21.15

25.1

25.44

29.62
77.42
88.90

34.93
73.77
89.43

18.17
70.25
86.60

23.95
56.36
74.96

8
14
26
8.7
2.8

12
18
21
3.40
1.18

76
87
87
44.3
7.0

94
95
95
33.6
8.2

Table 4: Data Targets. All statistics are for women. Data sources are detailed
in the Data Appendix.
parameter values have a bigger impact on marriage in 2000 vis à vis 1900. By
similar reasoning, this transpires because marriage was much more prevalent
in 1900 than today.

8.4

Opening the Black Box

The impact that parameter values have on the data targets can be analyzed
by computing the model’s Jacobian. The response of the j-th data target to
a displacement in the value of the i-th parameter is calculated in elasticity
form; i.e., [ i =Pj ( )] dPj ( )=d i . This is computed for all i and j involved
in (10). It turns out that (locally) a; ; O; ; and have a large e¤ect on
sexual behavior in 1900, but little impact on such behavior in 2000. By
contrast, the marriage statistics for 2000 display a bigger response to shifts
in the parameters than do the ones for 1900.
Figure 13 shows how the percentage of women who had premarital sex
by age 25 responds in the two steady states to a change in parameter values.
The percentage impact of a percentage movement in parameter values is
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Figure 13: The part of the Jacobian showing the response of the percentage
of women who had premarital sex before age 25 to a displacement in the
parameters. The Jacobian is presented in elasticity form. Note that the
units on the vertical scale for 1900 are much larger than the ones for 2000.
much larger for the 1900 steady state than for the 2000 one, as can be seen
by the units on the vertical axes. In 2000 almost all matched singles in the
model are having premarital sex so the percentage reaction is muted, while
for 1900 a small minority are so the percentage response is much bigger. The
reactions make sense too. For example, increasing the utility from abstinence,
a, or the cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, O, reduce the amount of premarital
sex in 1900. Raising the libido scale parameter, , which increases the ‡ow
of women into premarital sex given the threshold, results in a higher level of
premarital sex. The utility level for abstinence, a, has a negligible impact on
premarital sex in 2000, because almost no matched singles are abstinent.
Figure 14 does the same thing for the median age of marriage. Now a
given percentage displacement in the parameter values has a much larger
percentage impact on the 2000 steady state than for the 1900 one, as can
be seen by the units on the vertical axes. This is understandable. In the
2000 steady state the vast majority of matched singles choose to have a
sexual relationship. So, for example, they respond to an increase in the cost
of out-of-wedlock births, O, by moving into marriage (or marrying earlier).
A rise in the matching rate, , leads to a delay in marriage for the 2000
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Figure 14: The part of the Jacobian showing the response of the median age
of marriage to a displacement in the parameters. The Jacobian is presented
in elasticity form. Note that the units on the vertical scale for 2000 are much
larger than the ones for 1900, the opposite of Figure 13.
steady state, but entices people to marry just slightly earlier in the 1900
one. This transpires because in the 2000 steady state the cost of waiting
is lower because people can engage in non-marital sexual relationship. This
opportunity is more costly in the 1900 steady state, so people are less picky
about their mate, and hence marry earlier.

9

Conclusions

While fertility has been controlled for eons, premarital sex would have been
too risky for women historically. This began to change in the 19th century
when contraceptive technology improved and information about contraception disseminated (Section 3). The 19th and 20th centuries saw improvements in condoms and spermicides, and the introduction of diaphragms,
IUDs, and the pill. Just as important was the dissemination of information
about contraception, often at personal risk for the providers. In America this
started and ended with the crusaders Dr. Charles Knowlton and Margaret
Sanger. The hypothesis here is that advancement in contraception led to a
rise in premarital sex, an increase in out-of-wedlock births, and a fall in the
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fraction of the population that is married.
To address this hypothesis a marital search model is constructed. Each
period a single may meet a partner. A person can choose to marry their
partner or not (Section 5). If not, they can decide whether to have a premarital sexual relationship with the person (Section 6). The risk of a premarital
sexual relationship is an out-of-wedlock birth. As contraception improves
this risk is mitigated. It is shown theoretically that a drop in the failure rate
for contraception leads to a decline in the rate of marriage (Section 5), an
increase the fraction of singles who are sexually active (Section 6), a rise in
the proportion of the population that is never married (Section 7), and a
delay in the average age of marriage (Section 7).
The theoretical model is then confronted with the U.S. data (in Section
8). The quantitative analysis focuses on two periods in U.S. history; viz, 1900
and 2000. To start with, a time series is constructed measuring the e¢ cacy
of contraception. It is shown that the odds of a pregnancy for a sexually
active woman dropped dramatically between 1900 and 2015-18. This made
sex much safer for singles. The question then asked is whether the model can
explain, as a function of technological progress in contraception, the following
set of facts: the observed decline in marriage between 1900 and 2015-18, the
rise in premarital sex, the increase in out-of-wedlock births, and the uptick
in the number of sexual partners before marriage. The answer is yes.
A review of the relevant economics literature on marriage is presented
now.

10
10.1

Literature Review
Contraception and the Age of Marriage
An increasing use of birth control may be a cause of earlier
marriage. For if a young couple can contemplate a marriage without a baby within a year, and hence with only two to provide for,
and perhaps with the bride working at a paying job, we think
there would be more marriage than if a baby is pretty sure to
come within a year and the mother unable to earn any money.
Against this argument is the idea held by some that a young
woman practicing birth control could have sexual intercourse without marrying and without becoming a mother, hence she can have
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a man without marrying; and similarly a man can have a woman
without marriage. Thus marriage might be discouraged by the
spread of birth control. Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955, pp. 89-90)
As a theoretical proposition, Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955) thought that
the impact of contraception on the age of marriage could go either way.
While they note that “(i)t is very di¢ cult to test these ideas with data,”
they felt that the …rst hypothesis had more currency given that the age
of marriage was decreasing at the time–note the dip in the median age of
marriage between 1940 and 1960 shown in Figure 1. Goldin and Katz (2002)
advance a more modern version of this idea. They highlight two ways in
which better contraception, the pill, changed the lives of college-educated
women in the United States. First, the pill made the returns to investment
in professional careers, such as law and medicine, less uncertain by allowing
women to better time their fertility decisions. Second, the pill had a thicker
marriage market e¤ect: as more women delayed their entry into marriage,
each individual woman became less concerned about being left out in the
marriage market due to her career choice. In their empirical analysis, Goldin
and Katz (2002) exploit variations across U.S. states in the access of young
unmarried women to the pill. Their “most persuasive evidence for a role of
the pill is that its initial di¤usion among single women coincided with, and
is analytically related to, the increase in the age at …rst marriage and the
increase in women in professional degree programs”(p. 767).
Now, it is clear that fertility was under control well before the 1960s,
as Figure 4 showed. This is not to say that family planning policies, especially for developing countries, are not important.5 Also, the number of
sexually-active single women had risen dramatically before this time–Figure
3. Furthermore, you can go to professional school while married. This is
more common outside of the United States. The take o¤ in women going to
professional schools started after 1972. The ‡ow of women into higher education had started well before this though. By 1972, 42 percent of bachelors
degrees, 41 percent of masters degrees, and 18 percent of doctorates went to
women, which amounted to 42 percent of all non-professional degrees. The
respective numbers in 1900 were 19 percent, 19 percent, 8 percent, and 19
5

Cavalcanti, Kocharkov, and Santos (2019) introduce unwanted births into a model
of fertility decisions and growth, and show that family planning programs, which reduce
the number of unwanted pregnancies, can generate signi…cant gains in the educational
attainments of children and hence GDP.
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percent. The year 1972 was also when Title IX of the Education Amendments was signed into law. The law prohibited discrimination against women
in any federally-funded education programs. Goldin and Katz (2002) defense
is that its guidelines were not complete until 1975. While Title IX’s statutory
language was brief, it still would have been law upon enactment in 1972. It’s
likely that colleges and universities changed their admission policies before
1975, especially since there was uncertainty about what they would be legally
liable for. In fact, one could argue that the passage of Title IX was itself
a reaction to the changing place of women in education and the workplace.
On this, see Greenwood, Guner, and Vandenbrouke (2017) for a model where
the passage of women’s rights is an endogenous function of the state of the
economy. Last, Myers (2017), who revisits the empirical analysis by Goldin
and Katz (2002), …nds that the pill itself had little e¤ect on the age of …rst
marriages and births, while liberalized access to abortion had a much larger
e¤ect. So, the power of the pill, while important, may be overstated.
Before the pill was available to unmarried women, between its approval by
the FDA in 1960 and the late 1960s or early 1970s, only married women could
access it. Indeed, many U.S. states reduced the legal age of marriage from 21
to 18 during this period. According to Edlund and Machado (2015), these
changes allowed women to marry early, which would be in line with Ogburn
and Nimko¤’s (1955) …rst idea. Combined with the pill, however, this also
allowed them to widen the window between marriage and …rst birth and
improve educational and professional outcomes. Gershoni and Low (2018a)
document how the availability of in vitro fertilization in Israel has led to an
increase in average age at …rst marriage. In related work, Gershoni and Low
(2018b) discuss how this increased education levels for women and resulted
in higher paying careers. (Interestingly, Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955) discuss
the transplantation of ova in their book, but speculated that its e¤ect on the
family would be negligible.)

10.2

Premarital Sex and Out-of-Wedlock Births

Technological advance in contraception allowed women to separate sex from
marriage. This led to a dramatic increase in the fraction of women who
engaged in premarital sex during the 20th century; again see Figure 3. Yet,
despite the improvements in contraceptive technology, out-of-wedlock births
increased as well. Greenwood and Guner (2010) study premarital sex among
teenagers within the context of an equilibrium matching model. In the model
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individuals rationally weigh the costs and bene…ts from this risky activity.
Better contraceptives lower the expected cost of premarital sex. In their
quantitative analysis better contraceptives result in both an increase in the
fraction of teenagers having sex and the fraction of them becoming pregnant.
Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) also focus on this puzzle. They suggest
that better contraceptives, coupled with the availability of abortion, led to
the disappearance of shotgun marriages, and as a result there was an increase
in out-of-wedlock …rst births. In their framework prior to a sexual relationship single women may or may not ask for an implicit promise of marriage
in the event of pregnancy. With the advance of contraception and the legalization of abortion, men can choose among many sexually active single
women. Some single women who become pregnant may be willing to have
an abortion, others won’t. Competition on the marriage market may lead
to women who are opposed to abortion being reluctant to ask for a promise
of marriage should a pregnancy occur. But, why would men abide by such
an implicit promise? (I.e., their equilibrium is not subgame perfect.) This is
left unanswered in Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996).
On the basis of the observed decline of shotgun weddings, Kennes and
Knowles (2019) argue that an important ingredient in the rise of out-ofwedlock births is an increase in the value of single life with children relative
to marriage. Their vehicle for analysis is a repeated-matching model where
women are heterogeneous in the number of previous children and where singles make decisions each period regarding their sexual activity, birth control,
abortion, and whether to marry if pregnant. Low take-up rates of the pill and
the availability of abortion are critical features in their analysis. Kennes and
Knowles (2019) consider a number of candidates, such as the advent of legal
abortion, lower divorce costs, and increased frictions in shotgun weddings,
that might be responsible for the decline in shotgun marriages. Other things
might also have reduced the value of marriage relative to single life with children: more generous welfare bene…ts, rising living standards together with
the advent of labor-saving household technologies, and a lessening of the
stigma associated with an out-of-wedlock birth.
Premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births were stigmatized in yesteryear in
order to dissuade premarital sexual activity. Since societies then were much
poorer than ones today, out-of-wedlock births placed an enormous …nancial
burden on families, churches, and states. Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood,
and Guner (2014) model the formation and evolution of such social norms.
As premarital sexual activity became safer, parents, churches, and govern40

ments had less incentive to stigmatize premarital sex, given that socialization
is a costly activity. The relaxation of sexual norms operated to reinforce the
e¤ect that technological advancement in contraception had on the rise in
premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births. Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood,
and Guner (2014) formalize this intuition in a model of intergenerational
preference transmission. For models of preference transmission in other contexts, see Becker (1993), Bisin and Verdier (2001), and Doepke and Zilibotti
(2008).

10.3

Other Factors A¤ecting the Timing of Marriage

Clearly factors other than contraceptives a¤ect the timing of marriage. Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014), Greenwood, Guner, and Vandenbroucke
(2017), and Stevensen and Wolfers (2007) provide reviews of the literature.
10.3.1

Rising Wages

In his classic treatment of the topic, Becker (1991, p. 350) states that “the
family in the United States changed more rapidly (since 1950) than during any equivalent period since the founding of colonies. I believe that a
major cause of these changes is the growth in the earning power of women
as the American economy developed.” Higher relative earnings reduce the
gains from marriage for women and allows them to be more choosy between
married and single life. Regalia and Rios-Rull (2001) formalize this idea in a
quantitative model and show that increases in the relative earnings of women
can potentially account for almost ninety percent of the observed rise in the
share of single women since the mid-1970s. Shephard (2019) also focuses on
the e¤ects of a narrowing gender wage gap on marital outcomes. He builds
a life-cycle equilibrium model with endogenous human capital accumulation,
fertility, and home production to study time allocation and marriage decisions. His simulations show that the decline in the gender wage gap since
the 1980s is able to generate an increase in female employment, a decline in
male employment, an increase in the age-of-…rst marriage for women, and a
reduction in the marital age gap between men and women.
Other aspects of the wage structure can also a¤ect the incentive to marry.
Olivetti (2006) documents that the returns to labor market experience increased for women since the 1970s and this was an important factor in generating rising female labor-force participation. Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles
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(2002) show that, within a matching model of marriage, this will also increase the incentives of women to delay both fertility and marriage. Santos
and Weiss (2016), instead, focus on the rising labor income volatility since the
1970s, and show that if marriage involves consumption commitments, such as
children or housing, then a heightening in income volatility will delay entry
into marriage.
10.3.2

Household Technologies

Another key force that shaped families in the United States and elsewhere
was the dramatic improvements in households technologies. Improvements in
household durables freed women from housework and allowed them to enter
the labor force–see Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005). (Relatedly,
Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016, argue that advances in maternal medicine facilitated the entry of young women into the workplace.) These forces reduced
the bene…t from a traditional marriage; to wit, a breadwinner husband and a
housekeeper wife. Greenwood and Guner (2009) integrate home production
into a search model of marriage, and show that better household technologies
can account for a signi…cant part of the rise in divorce, the fall in marriage,
and the increase in married female labor-force participation that occurred
during the later half of the 20th century. According to Greenwood and
Guner (2009, p. 233), “the reduction of the economic bene…ts of marriage
allowed the modern criteria of mutual attraction between mates to come to
the fore, a trend ‘from economics to romance’in the words of Ogburn and
Nimko¤ (1955).”They also show how improvements in household technology
and increases in income can explain the increase in marriage between 1940
and 1960–for one more time, recall Figure 1.6
As marriage declined in the United States, there has also been an upswing
in assortative mating, the tendency of people with similar educational attainments to marry each other (Chiappori, Selanie, and Weiss, 2017, and Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos, 2014). Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov,
and Santos (2016) develop a model, with heterogenous agents, of marriage,
divorce, educational attainment, and married female labor-force participa6

The idea is that technological progress in the household sector, together with rising
living standards, at …rst made it easier for young couples to leave their parents’homes and
establish married households and then later on in time for singles to leave their parents’s
homes and establish single households before marriage. That is, there is a trend over time
toward smaller and smaller households.
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tion. They show how a hike in the college premium together labor-saving
technological progress in the household sector, led to a decline marriage, an
increase married female labor-force participation, and widening inequality in
the United States. The induced changes in married female labor-force participation and marriage play an important role in amplifying the impact of
shifts in the wage structure on inequality.
10.3.3

The Welfare State

The expansion of welfare state, in particular social assistance to single mothers with children, has often been pointed to as another important force that
has shaped U.S. families. There are mixed views about this idea. The empirical evidence in favor of the idea, which relies on cross-time and cross-state
variations in welfare policies, has been weak–see Mo¢ tt (1992) for an early
review and Mo¢ tt, Pheland, and Miller (2019) for a more recent analysis. Structural models such as Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000) and
Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000) predict that less generous welfare
payments should reduce the number of single women. In line with this prediction, Low, Meghir, Pistaferri, and Voena (2018) show that the 1996 welfare
reform did result in more married women.
10.3.4

Lack of Marriageable Men

A large literature in sociology and demography, emphasizes the lack of marriageable men as a potential factor for the decline of marriage in the United
States. The basic idea, following Wilson and Neckerman (1987), is that
low wage growth, declining manufacturing, and rising incarceration in recent
decades made marriageable men scarce. Shneider, Harknett, and Stimpson (2018) document, for example, that reduced economic prospects and
increased risk of incarceration contributed signi…cantly to the decline of marriage in the United States over the last 45 years. Incarceration has also been
proposed as a factor that can explain why blacks marry at a much lower rate
than whites in the United States. Exploiting cross-state U.S. data, Charles
and Luoh (2010) …nd a strong negative e¤ect of male incarceration rates on
the likelihood of women ever getting married. Building on this intuition,
Caucutt, Guner, and Rauh (2018) develop an equilibrium search model of
marriage, divorce, and labor supply that takes into account the transitions
between employment, unemployment, and prison for individuals by educa43

tion, gender, and race. They show that if black men had the same employment and prison transitions as whites, then about half of the racial marriage
gap would be eliminated.
10.3.5

Changes in the Sex Ratio

Since historically it took two sexes, a man and a woman, to form a marriage,
the sex ratio (de…ned as the number of single men to single women) can a¤ect
marriage decisions. If there is an imbalance in the sex ratio, whoever is on
the short side of the market will have a harder time to …nd a partner. When
a marriage is formed, the sex in short supply will have a higher bargaining
power. These features emerge in standard search and matching models (e.g.,
Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles 2000).
What can generate an imbalanced sex ratio? Some candidates are changes
in population growth rates (say a baby boom or baby bust), male incarceration, sex-biased migration, and wars. Angrist (2002) exploits, as a natural
experiment, variations in migration ‡ows during the early 20th century in
the United States. He …nds that migration, which increased the size of the
male population more for some ethnic groups than others, improved marriage
prospects for women. In particular, it increased the likelihood of marriage for
women and reduced female labor-force participation. The latter is a re‡ection of a tilt in household bargaining power toward women. Angrist (2002, p.
997) provides a quote from a Moroccan female immigrant saying “Every day
I meet someone better. I am waiting for the best.” Bronson and Mozzocco
(2017) document, by analyzing nearly century of U.S. data, that higher cohort sizes are associated with lower marriage rates for both men and women.
They …nd that variations in cohort sizes can explain a large variation in
marriage rates since the 1930s.
Recent research suggests that the theoretical link between sex ratios and
marriage can be complex. An excellent example is Knowles and Vandenbroucke (2019) who analyze the aftermath in France of World War I. They
show that after World War I marriage rates increased for both men and
women in France, despite a large drop in the sex ratio. They build a directed
search model of marriage in which young and old men and women have different preferences for marriage. In particular, young men are less inclined to
marry than either old men or young and old women. Due to bleak economic
prospects, World War I was not a good time to marry and raise a family–see
Vandenbroucke (2014) for an analysis of this. This impacted the marriage
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rates for older men more than younger ones, because the latter weren’t as
likely to marry. As a result the stock of single older men was a¤ected more
than for the stock of younger ones. Consequently, following the War the
stock of marriageable men was high despite large casualties; furthermore,
casualties were higher for younger men which compounded the situation.
Bronson and Mozzocco (2018) note that standard models of marriage
would have a di¢ cult time explaining how an increase in cohort size leads to
a fall in the marriage rates for both men and women. Since women usually
marry older men an increase in a cohort would reduce the ratio of marriageable men to women. A standard model would predict a fall in the marriage
rate for women and a rise in the one for men. To overcome this prediction,
they adapt the standard model so that men can undertake a pre-marital investment that increases their probability of meeting a potential spouse (as
in Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss 2009). When the population is growing and
men are in a relatively better position in the marriage market, they have
lower incentives for pre-marital investment, which can result in lower marriage rates for them as well as women. Last, as discussed earlier, Caucutt,
Guner, and Rauh (2018) analyze how the high incarceration (and unemployment) rates for black males has reduced the stock of marriageable men and
has led to low marriage rates for blacks.
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Appendix: Beers’Speci…cation of Letters
Patent
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Appendix: Theory

Proof of Proposition 5 (Mean and Median Ages of Marriage). Focus on the mean age of marriage, as given by equation (6). As can be deduced
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from Table 1, the average age of marriage can be rewritten as
Pj
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Consider the distribution function given by ( li=1 si 1 )=( ji=1 si 1 ), for 0
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+ W (w )] :

It is easy to check the righthand side is decreasing in w . This implies that
the distribution function is stochastically increasing in w in the sense of
…rst-order stochastic dominance; i.e., the odds of marrying by age l have decreased, while the odds of marrying after age l have increased. Trivially, the
integer i is increasing in i. Consequently, by the theorem of …rst-order stochastic dominance [see Hadar and Russell (1971)] the average age of marriage
must be increasing in w and hence by Proposition 1.
The median age of marriage lies between l and l + 1, where
Pl
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:
Pj
j
i=1 ni
i=1 si 1
i=1 ni
i=1 si 1

There are two cases to consider. The …rst case is where the median age of
marriage moves out of the interval [l; l + 1]. From the above analysis, the
far righthand side is decreasing in w . This implies that the median age of
marriage will increase in this situation. The second case is where the median
age of marriage remains within the interval [l; l + 1]. Here the median age of
marriage is …xed at (l + l + 1)=2 = l:5. So in the second case the median age
of marriage is nondecreasing in the e¢ cacy of contraception.
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Appendix: Data Sources
Figures and Tables
Figure 1 (fraction of the female population, 18-30, never married, 18802015): The data for 1880-1990 is from the Historical Statistics of the
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United States: Millennial Edition (Table Aa614-683). The data for
2000-2015 is based on the authors’calculations from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s American Community Survey.
Figure 1 (median age at …rst marriage, 1880-2018): United States Census Bureau, Historical Marital Status Tables, Table MS-2.
Figure 2 (percentage of births to unmarried women, 1920-2017): For
1920 and 1930, see Cutright (1972, Table 1, p. 383); for the data between 1940 and 1999, see Ventura and Bachrach (2000, Table 1, p.
17); for 1999-2013, see Curtin, Ventura, and Martinez (2014); for 2014,
2015, 2016, and 2017, see National Vital Statistics Reports-Births: Final Data for the corresponding years.
Figure 2 (non-marital births by age group per 1,000 women): Computed for the years 1940 to 1990 from Historical Statistics of the United
States (Tables Aa614-683 and Ab264-305). For the years 2000 and
2007, the numbers are calculated using the birth rates for unmarried
women, as reported in the National Vital Statistics Reports, and the
fraction of unmarried women, calculated using IPUMS USA.
Figure 3 (premarital sex): For births cohorts pre-1900 to 1910-1919,
the data is taken from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 83, p. 339). The data
for the later cohorts is from Wu, Martin, and England (2018, Table 3,
p. 733).
Figure 3 (number partners before marriage): The data for the birth
cohorts from pre-1900 to 1910-1919 are from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table
78, p. 336). The numbers for the later cohorts are based on authors’
calculations from the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS).
The numbers presume that the woman had premarital sex with her
future husband.
Figure 4 (total fertility rate for white women): The numbers for 1800
to 1990 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States (Table
Ab52-117). For the years 1991 to 2015, the data comes from Martin et
al. (2017, Table 4, p. 21).
Figure 4 (complementary cumulative distribution functions over children ever born): Historical Statistics of the United States (Table Ab498535).
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Figure 12 (annual failure rate for contraception, 1900 to 2015-18): The
annual failure rate data is provided in the last column of Table 6. The
series is constructed from the data presented in Tables 5 and 6 on the
uses and e¤ectiveness of contraception.
Table 4 (data targets): The fraction of women ever married by age for
1900 comes from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition, Table Aa614-683. For the year 2000 the data is from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s brief “Marital Status: 2000.”The number of
out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 unmarried women in 1920 derives from
Cutright (1972, Table 1, p. 383). The corresponding number for 1998
is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial
Edition, Table Ab264-305. The fractions of women who had premarital
sex in 1900 are taken from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 83, p. 339). For
2004 the numbers are in line with Wu, Martin, and England (2018, Table 3, p. 733). In particular, the fraction for age 25 is set equal to the
fraction found for age 30, which is what the Wu, Martin, and England
(2018) data strongly suggests. For 1900 the number of partners before
marriage is for the before-1900 cohort listed in Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 78, p. 336). The number for 2000 is based on authors’calculations
from the 1992 National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) and
pertains to women born between 1963 and 1972.
Tables 5 and 6 (use and e¤ectiveness of contraception): See the detailed
discussion below.

13.2

Contraceptive Use

Table 5 presents data on the use of contraception. For construction of the
data before 1985, see Greenwood and Guner (2010). For 1985-2008, the numbers are taken from Mosher (2010, Table 3, p. 20). The data for 2010-18 are
based on authors’calculations from the National Survey of Family Growth
(waves from 2006-10 to 2015-17). The usage of multiple contraceptives by
users was not reported until the 1995 NSFG. After that year, the sum across
di¤erent methods is more than the total fraction who use any method. In
Table 5 the percentage distribution across di¤erent methods is normalized
to sum up to the total fraction who use any method. The “other” methods
category includes the use of diaphragms, cervical caps, IUDs, vaginal sper49

Contraceptive Use at First Premarital Intercourse, %
Period none pill condom withdrawal
other
1900-59 61.4
9.42
11.19
17.99
1960-64 61.4 4.2
21.9
7.3
5.3
1965-69 54.2 8.6
24.0
9.5
3.7
1970-74 55.6 12.1
21.0
7.3
4.0
1975-79 53.5 12.8
22.0
7.5
4.2
1980-82 46.9 14.2
26.7
8.4
3.8
1983-88 34.6 12.1
41.8
8.9
2.6
1985-89 34.0 13.7
43.2
6.8
2.3
1990-94 30.3 15.4
47.3
4.5
2.5
1995-99 27.5 17.0
48.7
5.0
1.8
2000-04 24.2 17.0
53.4
2.5
2.9
2005-08 15.9 15.1
56.4
7.1
5.4
2010-14 19.4 21.9
51.3
3.3
4.2
2015-17 10.0 19.9
56.2
3.4
10.5
Table 5: The table shows contraception use at …rst premarital intercourse at
various point in time. All numbers are expressed as percentages.
micides (such as foams, jellies, creams, and sponges), the rhythm method,
and injections and implants which were introduced in 1990s.

13.3

Contraceptive E¤ectiveness

Table 6 gives the annual failure rates for condoms, the pill, withdrawal,
and other methods. For construction of the failure rates before 2000, see
Greenwood and Guner (2010). For 2000-2008, the failure rates for no method,
the pill, condoms, and withdrawal are taken from Hatcher et al. (2004, Table
9-2, p. 226). For 2010-2014, the failure rates come from Hatcher et al. (2011,
Table 3-2, p. 50). For 2015-2018, they derive from Hatcher et al. (2018, Table
3-2, p. 100).
Given the small number of people using other methods the results are
not very sensitive to the assumption made regarding their e¤ectiveness. In
Greenwood and Guner (2003), the e¤ectiveness of other methods is assumed
to be 20 percent until the end of 1980s and 10 percent afterwards, until
50

Effectiveness of Contraception (annual failure rates), %
Period none pill condom withdrawal other All (technology)
1900-59 85.0
45.0
59.2
50.0
72.05
1960-64 85.0 7.5
17.5
22.5
20.0
59.04
1965-69 85.0 7.5
17.5
22.5
20.0
53.79
1970-74 85.0 7.5
17.5
22.5
20.0
54.29
1975-79 85.0 7.5
17.5
22.5
20.0
52.81
1980-82 85.0 7.5
17.5
22.5
20.0
48.25
1983-88 85.0 3.4
11.0
20.5
20.0
36.76
1985-89 85.0 3.4
11.0
20.5
10.0
35.73
1990-94 85.0 5.5
14.5
20.5
10.0
34.63
1995-99 85.0 5.5
14.5
23.0
10.0
32.69
2000-04 85.0 8.0
15.0
27.0
5.0
30.76
2005-08 85.0 8.0
15.0
27.0
5.0
25.38
2010-14 85.0 9.0
9.0
22.0
5.0
28.63
2015-17 85.0 7.0
7.0
20.0
5.0
18.39
Table 6: The table shows the annual failure rates for contraception. All
numbers are expressed as percentages.
around 2000. Given the continuous improvements in many contraceptions,
such as the IUD, diaphragms, and introduction of new ones, for example the
patch, a failure rate of 5 percent is assumed for other methods since 2000.
The last column in Table 6 gives annual failure rate across all contraceptive technologies. This series is plotted in Figure 12. To do this, an average
is computed over the e¤ectiveness of each method of birth control listed in
Table 6. When doing this each practice is weighted by its yearly frequency
of use, as shown in Table 5.
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